NG, Kwai Hang, and Xin HE. 2017. Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-Making in China. New York: Cambridge University Press by Li, Peifan
 China Perspectives 
2018-4 | 2018
Power and Knowledge in 21st Century China:
Producing Social Sciences
NG, Kwai Hang, and Xin HE. 2017. Embedded Courts:
Judicial Decision-Making in China. New York:
Cambridge University Press 
Book reviews
Peifan Li
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/8571
ISSN: 1996-4617
Publisher
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 31 December 2018
ISSN: 2070-3449
 
Electronic reference
Peifan Li, « NG, Kwai Hang, and Xin HE. 2017. Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-Making in China. New
York: Cambridge University Press  », China Perspectives [Online], 2018-4 | 2018, Online since 12
February 2019, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
chinaperspectives/8571 
This text was automatically generated on 28 October 2019.
© All rights reserved
NG, Kwai Hang, and Xin HE. 2017. 
Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-
Making in China. New York:
Cambridge University Press 
Book reviews
Peifan Li
1 Since  Reform and Opening in  the  1980s,
the  judiciary  in  China  has  experienced
significant  development  alongside  the
country’s  rapid  economic  growth  and
global  market  integration.  State-led
professionalisation  has  led  to  the  belief
that  Chinese  courts  are  becoming
increasingly  similar  to  their  Western
counterparts. However, this belief is based
on the assumption that the legal system is
a homogeneous judicial entity conforming
to  powerful  top-down  policies,  an
assumption  contradicted  by  the
narratives of regional disparity recounted
in Embedded Courts: Judicial Decision-Making in China. In this book, Ng and He suggest that
the  operational  patterns  of  Chinese  courts  are  not  monolithic.  Beneath  the  courts’
surface uniformity in implementing laws lies significant heterogeneity. In their study
of the underlying mechanism causing this heterogeneity, Ng and He have identified
four types of forces: administrative, political, social, and economic embeddedness, and
they vividly depict how Chinese courts adapt to these external influences.
2 The book begins  by contrasting the working scene of  a  court  in  a  developing area
versus that in a developed one, identifying two typical operational patterns: “work-unit
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courts” and “firm courts” (pp. 6-7). These two types of courts are quite different in
terms of  four key attributes:  “vertical  hierarchy,  administrative nature of  decision-
making process,  the  organization-oriented model  of  promotion and the  role  of  the
court for its judges” (p. 8). The term “work-unit” refers to the socialist and collectivist
employment  system,  while  the  “firm  courts”  are  organised  according  to  a  “quasi-
market  mechanism”  (p.  12).  In  a  work-unit  court,  tight  vertical  control  is  more
important than efficiency; social skills are deemed more important than expertise and
knowledge, and judges rely heavily on socio-economic welfare provided by the courts.
Firm-type courts, on the other hand, have a “weakened hierarchy” (p. 12), a “tendency
to use more law” (p. 13), an enhanced role of professionalism, and fluid employment of
judges.
3 Chapter 2 describes the different components of frontline judges’ daily work and the
“structurally porous” (p. 53) judicial process in Chinese courts. They depict the three
main  sections  of  the  judges’  work  routine:  adjudications,  mediations,  and  post-
judgement work, and reveal the features of judges’ investigations, the administrative
hierarchy of courts, and the increasingly individualistic operations of collegial panels.
Chapter 3 focuses on generational differences between cohorts of judges divided into
three groups: veteran, middle-aged, and post-1980s. These cohorts differ substantially
in their training background, administrative identity, and professional or technocrat
mentality. As suggested by the authors, the Chinese judiciary has experienced a process
of  “intellectualization”  (p.  74).  Post-1980s  judges  are  more  reluctant  than  their
predecessors  to submit  to  administrative  control;  they  admire  professionalism  and
value  the  use  of  laws.  This  generational  tension  regarding  outcome-oriented
management also reflects attempts by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) to manage
regional  fragmentation  by  promoting  legal  coherence  through  education.  In  this
chapter, Ng and He also envisage that the firm-type mentality will become increasingly
dominant in China based on the supersedence of the judiciary. 
4 Chapter  4  studies  administrative  embeddedness  and  explores  how  the various
components  of  judges’  work  rounds  are  related  to  each  other.  Ng  and  He  use  the
minutes of a work-unit court’s adjudication committee to investigate the bureaucratic
nature of Chinese courts. The administrative hierarchy of the committee is organised
according to the principles of  professional  competence and collegiality to a  limited
extent, but administrative rank overrides legal expertise; senior judges use both formal
and informal methods to influence the judgements of junior judges. In the firm court,
this  vertical  control  is  less  common,  partly  because  of  the  heavy  caseload,  so  the
hierarchy appears to be flatter. However, internal administrative supervision is only
one  facet  of  administrative  embeddedness,  as  the  blurred  boundary  between  the
judiciary and other party-state institutions facilitates external administrative impact
on the courts. For example, it is common for senior judges with administrative power
to have experience working in other party-state organs. In addition, court presidents
are  usually  members  of  the  Political-Legal  Committee  (PLC),  which  is  a  major
component of the local party-state. They are hence responsible for serving as a linkage
to facilitate the “local party coalition” (p. 109) in some political or state actions, such as
resolving collective social protests or legitimising some administrative processes. The
dual roles of the senior judges create a “hand-in-glove relationship” (p. 120), in which
external administrative impact is reinforced through internal administrative authority.
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5 Chapter  5  examines  political  embeddedness,  or  the “instrumental  nature  of  law in
promoting  broader  government  operations  of  stability  maintenance”  (p.  122).
Compared to  their  Western counterparts,  Chinese courts  have long been subject  to
political  concerns  rather  than  to  promotion  of  law.  Nowadays,  political  concerns
prioritise stable governance,  influencing the judicial  system in four ways.  First,  the
judiciary is accountable to the People’s Congress at the same level; second, the courts
are involved in many stability-maintenance actions, some of which are even outside the
realm  of  law;  politics  sometimes  hinder  the  issuing  or  exercising  of  legal
determinations; the penetrating political impacts also set limits on the exercise of law.
Ng  and  He  discuss  political  embeddedness  using  specific  cases  involving  petitions,
highly contested divorce, and housing demolition. Judges are reluctant to adjudicate
cases that might trigger petitions, for fear of the petitioning system, which blames legal
practitioners rather than the law per se. In contested divorce cases, judges assess the
mental condition of both parties and the potential risk of conflict escalation and then
propose a solution that can minimise malicious incidents. In housing demolition cases,
litigation has  become an instrument to  uphold collective  social  protests.  Compared
with that of firm courts, the extent to which judges are eager to maintain social and
political stability is greater in the work-unit courts in developing areas, and in recent
years,  the  tension between promoting stability  and implementing laws has  become
increasingly prominent as China has urbanised.
6 Chapter  6  mainly  deals  with social  embeddedness,  which refers  to  the influence of
social ties on the judicial decision-making process. Social ties affect judges’ decision-
making  through  both  cultural  and  institutional  paths:  horizontal influence  from
members of their private circle, to whom judges feel a sense of obligation, and vertical
influence  from  administrative  superiors,  who  can  influence  judges’  career
advancement or welfare distribution. Ng and He suggest that superior and strong ties
bring the most significant impact, whereas non-superior and weak ties are the least
influential, and non-superior but strong ties and superior but weak ties have strong but
limited  influence.  In  work-unit  courts,  the  vertical  administrative  relationship  is
stronger than in firm courts because judges rely heavily on welfare allocated by their
supervisors; therefore, social embeddedness manifests itself more than in firm courts.
Hence,  the  authors  also  point  out  the  interplay  of  social  embeddedness  and  other
forces. 
7 The last part of this book examines the economic embeddedness that determines the
degree of  a  court’s  fiscal independence from local  government.  Since  the 1990s,  in
order to deliver affordable judicial services, Chinese courts have adopted a “dual-track”
policy that unhooks funding of the courts from the revenue they make. However, some
courts, especially work-unit courts in less-developed areas that are short of funds, have
to justify their deficit to local governments in order to obtain further fiscal support. For
firm courts, the abundant income derived from litigation fees and other sources has
enabled  them  to  operate  without  the  need  for  budgetary  funds;  this  secures  their
political autonomy to some extent. It also reduces administrative control of frontline
judges by senior judges. 
8 This book synthesises the authors’ comprehensive research and penetrating insights
into the Chinese court system and provides abundant empirical evidence to understand
the mechanism of the Chinese judicial system’s heterogeneity. The analysis sheds light
on how Chinese judges adapt to constraints and exert their authority. When presenting
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the four types of embeddedness, Ng and He by no means treat them in a disparate way,
but implicitly embrace the interplay of different forces. For instance, it is suggested
that heavy administrative control  can reinforce the effects  of  social  embeddedness,
while  the  growth  of  self-supporting  fiscal  income  can  limit  vertical  administrative
control. However, the authors place great emphasis on how economic embeddedness
influences the extent to which the courts are embedded in the other three aspects but
not  vice versa.  The overemphasis  on economic embeddedness confines the analysis
within  a  limited  local  scope  and  overlooks  the  nature  of  competition  (Zhou  2004)
among local governments under the party-state system, and thus puts the courts into a
passive position where they need to adapt to these types of forces. The book’s second
author, in fact, has proposed elsewhere the idea of “spill-over effect,” revealing that
successful local innovation in one place may trigger a change of state law or regulation
and influence the judicial practice in other places (He 2013). Moreover, when discussing
administrative  embeddedness,  the  authors  examine  evidence  mainly  drawn  from  a
work-unit court, and the lack of depiction in developed areas may limit the readers’
understanding  of  firm  courts.  Nevertheless,  this  impressive  work,  based  on  solid
qualitative research, provides vivid depictions of the tensions, constraints, and struggle
confronting  the  courts  in  China’s  seemingly  uniform  judicial  system,  thereby
facilitating an understanding of the path of judiciary professionalisation in China. 
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